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I. IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW
Every student of Islamic law is familiar with the formation of contract
by offer (jdb) and acceptance (qabUd). Of the rules of jdb and qabl one
can quote Karl Llewellyn's statement about their common law counter-
parts: they "have been worked over; they have been written over; they
have been shaped and rubbed smooth with pumice, they wear the rich
deep polish of a thousand class rooms."' The apparent prominence of offer
and acceptance in the two legal systems, however, should not mislead one
into seeing similarity where there is significant difference. Some of these
differences are the subject of this paper.
This paper will argue two things: one that offer and acceptance play a
vastly more important role in the Islamic than in the common law of
contract, the other that the Islamic law of contract bears a more signifi-
cant resemblance to the medieval action of debt than to our modern law of
contract. For reasons that will become apparent, this paper will focus on
the implied-in-fact contract, that is, the contract formed without an ex-
press verbal exchange of offer and acceptance. An example of this type of
contract is that which we make when we pay for an item at the checkout
counter of a supermarket.
Such implied-in-fact contracts are not problematical for our modern
authorities on the law of contract. "Contractual duty," Corbin writes, "is
imposed by reason of a promissory expression. As to this, there is no
difference between an express contract and an implied contract; all con-
* A.B., Harvard College; Ph.D., Near Eastern Languages, Harvard University; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. Currently associated with the law firm of Rosenman, Colin, Freund,
Lewis & Cohen, New York City.
I Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 1, 48 YALE L.J. 1, 32
(1938).
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tracts are express contracts. But there are different modes of expression." 2
The logic of this position is undeniable. If the basis of contractual liability
is mutual consent, what does it matter how this consent is manifested?
The unanimity of modern Anglo-American contract scholars on this
point distinctly contrasts with the diversity of Muslim opinion. For cen-
turies, Muslim jurists acrimoniously debated the validity of implied-in-
fact contracts. Their debate can be dated back as far as the tenth century
and traced up through the nineteenth century, with an extensive array of
arguments on both sides of the issue. Compromise solutions between full
validity and invalidity were developed. Only the briefest outline of this
complex doctrinal history, one that completely passes over the theological
and polemical dimensions of the legal debate, will be given here.
The general development of Muslim teaching on the implied-in-fact
contract can be simply summarized. Of the well-known schools of law,
only Malikism appears to have recognized the full validity of such con-
tracts throughout its history; classical Hanafism and Hanbalism held the
same position. For a long time, the Shaficites and Shicites would not
recognize the validity of implied-in-fact contracts. This remained the
teaching of these schools until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
respectively. The fullest surviving discussions of the subject come, in fact,
from Shicite works of the past century.3
In view of the fact that the Qur'an and its traditions contain virtually
no textual support for the requirement of an express offer and acceptance,
and because the Qur'an itself bases the legitimacy of commerce on mutual
assent (tarddt),4 persistent opposition to implied contracts for so many
centuries is surprising. This opposition to the implied contract must, at
least in part, be explained by the sheer weight of school tradition. Clearly,
enormous pressure to bring legal doctrine into conformity with actual
practice existed.5
The basis for requiring that contracts be formed by a verbal exchange of
offer and acceptance is not entirely clear. An unusually explicit statement
2 A. CoRmIN, CoNTRAcTs 18 (1963). The same view is taken in 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS 3 (3d ed. 1957). The prevailing tradition is that the implied-in-fact contract "is
not an interesting phenomenon at all." See F KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 117 (1970).
3 The following account draws upon an unpublished paper of mine, Implied-in-Fact
Sales in Islamic Law: The Formalism of Offer and Acceptance.. Full documentation for the
statements in the text can be found therein. For a clear historically inadequate treatment,
see 1 Y. LNATr DE BELLEFONDS, TRAITP DE DROIT MUSULMAN COMPARt 135-40 (1965). Some
notion of the Shi'ite discussion can be gathered from A. AMIR-SOLEYMANI, LA FORMATION
ET LES EFFETS DES CONTRATS EN DROIT IRANIEN COMPARgS AVEC LE DROIT
FRANQALS (1936).
' QUR'AN 4:29.
5 The leading statement of this tension is 2 AL-GHAZZALi, I14YA CULOM AL-DIN 85-87
(1967).
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of the underlying policy is, however, provided by a Shicite jurist of the
eighteenth century:
Sale [the paradigmatic Islamic contract] is not formed by gesture,
writing or handshaking or by the likes of muldmasa, mundbadha
and hasalt, even when these are not conjoined with anything that
renders the contract conditional or aleatory. None of these oper-
ates as a conveyance or even a license to use by virtue of legal
principle, consensus and the inadequacy of action to express inner
intentions such as that of passing title .... They do not rise above
mere probability, which is not enough .... Furthermore, civil
transactions were ordained for the proper ordering of this life,
which is desired in itself and for the sake of the world to come.
These transactions are a fertile source of dissension, so that they
had to be regulated in accordance with something external that
could serve to express the inner purposes thereby intended.6
The point being made is, to quote a contemporary Romanist, that "de-
livery is in law a colourless act. It derives its legal colour from the circum-
stances in which it is made." 7 Those Muslim jurists who required an
express offer and acceptance regarded only these acts as sufficiently un-
ambiguous to demarcate the legal character of the transaction in
question.
The reference to muldmasa, mundbadha and hasct in the Shicite pas-
sage quoted above is interesting, for it may shed light on the original
motivating force behind the demand for an express offer and acceptance, a
force that did not expend itself for a millennium. These terms, which I
have left untranslated, refer to pre-Islamic transactions, all of which were
prohibited by the Prophet. Unfortunately, we cannot readily grasp what
these transactions involved, for our Islamic sources are already unclear
about them.8 Consequently, we do not know what led to their prohibition.
Important for our purposes is the Muslim jurists' belief that these pro-
hibited transactions had involved formal conveyances effected by sym-
bolic, irrational actions. The jurists who demanded an express offer and
acceptance based this requirement on the premise that recognizing the
passage of title by delivery alone would amount to condoning the survival
of these pre-Islamic practices in a new form. For them, implied-in-fact
Muhammad Mahdi al-Tab.tab'i (d. 1212/1797-8), quoted by his student al-Jawerd al-
Husayni in K. AL-MATAJIR MIN MIFrAi AL-KARAMA 160 (Cairo 1905).
7 B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 117 (1962).
1 Some of the common explanations are already collected in 2 AL-QAD! AL-NucMAN,
DACA'IM AL-ISLAM 21-22 (1961). F. ARIN, RECHERCHES HISTORIQUES SUR LES OPPRATIONS
USURAIRES ET ALEATOIRES EN DROIT MUSULMAN (1909) (summarizing the traditional
material).
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contracts were not informal at all, but represented the recrudescence of
formalism.9
The dispute surrounding the validity of implied-in-fact contracts con-
cerned the Islamic standard imposed upon parties to a contract for artic-
ulating their intent. The disagreement was essentially over applying a
broad or a restrictive interpretation of the prophetic prohibitions.
Although put forward as a rejection of formalism, the requirement of an
express offer and acceptance cannot itself escape entirely the label of
formalistic. In its most rigorous version, this requirement attains a dis-
tinctly religious cast which, among other things, calls for the use of fully
inflected classical Arabic. 10 Contracts at the time of the Prophet were,
after all, concluded in this language." Notably, an oral offer and accep-
tance were required; writing was not sufficient. 2 This suggests, although
it hardly demonstrates, that the prohibited pre-Islamic contracts may
have had a religious significance which Islam could not countenance and
that the starting point for the centuries-long legal debate was the con-
frontation of religions.
II. IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACTS IN THE COMMON LAW
The essential elements of the Islamic debate over implied-in-fact con-
tracts are found in the earliest discussion of the problem, with later
writers providing a more refined analysis. The common law development
is quite different and reflects the stages, or the layers that constitute the
history of the common law of contract. Two of the old forms of action are of
direct relevance to our inquiry: debt and assumpsit, the origin of our
modern law of contract.
Debt, which appeared in the twelfth century, was, in the form of debt
sur contract, the leading contractual action of medieval law.13 This action
was available to enforce an obligation to pay money or to deliver goods
sold. To sue in debt the plaintiff was required to point to some transaction,
such as a loan or a sale, in which he had already performed his part. The
plaintiff also had to show that the debt arose from the transaction; that is,
from the conduct of the parties and not from their words. A significant
qualification was the requirement that money claimed had to be a sum
certain. In the first place, however, this was a rule of pleading and does not
indicate much about the transactions that precipitated the institution of
9 5 AL-CASQALANi, FATH AL-BARI' 263 (Cairo 1959).
10 3 MUHSIN FAYD AL-KASHANI, AL-MAHAJJA AL-BAYDA' Ft TAHDHIB AL-IHYA 156-58
(Tehran 1339-40/1960-63).
11 CALl AL-KARAKI, JAM1n AL-MAQ AD (unpaginated)(Tehran n.d.).
12 See supra note 6 and accompanying text; 1 ABO IsHAQ AL-SHIRAZI, AL-MUHADHDHAB
257 (Cairo c4sa al-Babi al-Halabi n.d.).
13 S. STOIJAR, A HIsTORY OF CONTRACT AT COMMON LAW 7, 10-11 (1975).
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the action. Secondly, there were cases in which the sum could be rendered
certain by circumstances, such as via market regulations.1
4
The situation in medieval common law was practically the inverse of
that in Islamic law. Implied-in-fact contracts (a singularly inappropriate
term in this context), enforced by the action of debt, were at the center of
the stage. Oral agreements were without sanction in the royal courts;
these consisted "but in fleeting words, and no action was allowed in the
royal courts for mere breath.""1 An undertaking to do something had to be
enforced by the action of covenant, which required a sealed writing.
Debt had a significant drawback which led to its demise, namely, wager
of law. A defendant could escape liability by swearing an oath supported
by oath-helpers. The increasingly popular action of assumpsit, on the
other hand, provided for trial by jury. Slade's Case, decided in 1602, estab-
lished that assumpsit could be brought in those cases where debt also lay.
This crucial step was achieved by importing into every executory contract
a promise to perform; it was for the breach of this implied promise that
assumpsit provided a remedy.16
Although the holding in Slade's Case refers to executory contracts, the
implication of a promise did not require an exchange of words. General
allegations of conduct, as in the common counts of indebitatus assumpsit,
were sufficient. Such allegations were always coupled with the nontraver-
sable allegation of a promise, and in theory, the action was brought for
breach of this subsequent promise to pay the amount already owed. The
implication of promises reached past the boundary of debt and included
those transactions in which no price had been fixed by the parties. The
law implied a promise to pay the amount the services rendered or the
goods delivered were worth, e.g., quantum meruit or quantum valebant.
The same process of implying promises was further extended to cases of
unjust enrichment to create the law of quasi-contract. 7
Throughout these developments, implied-in-fact contracts retained
their place at the center of contract law. Although it was established that
a promise given for a promise would maintain an action on the case, the
way in which mutual promises provided consideration for each other re-
mains something of a puzzle in the common law tradition.' It is signifi-
cant that contracts of sale in which performance had taken place fell
outside the Statute of Frauds so as to be enforceable without a signed
writing.19
At this stage in the development of contract law we have not encoun-
tered any sharp line drawn between implied-in-fact contracts and those
14 A. SIMPSON, A HisroRy OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRAcT 64-65 (1975).
15 J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HisTORY 268 (2d ed. 1979).
16 Slade's Case (1602), Rep. 92a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1073.
17 On these developments see J. BAKER, supra note 15, at 306-14.
'8 J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CoNTRAcTs 75 (1974).
19 The Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1677).
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formed by the exchange of offer and acceptance. At this stage, it is too
early to properly speak of implied-in-fact contracts, which were identified
and labeled as such only after offer and acceptance had appeared on the
scene in the nineteenth century. Professor Simpson has shown how in the
nineteenth century "a doctrine of offer and acceptance was superimposed
upon the sixteenth-century requirement of consideration and made to
perform some of the same functions and some new ones generated prin-
cipally by the problem of written contracts by correspondence. ' 20 The
formation of contract, previously a question of fact for the jury, became
subject to rules designed to provide certainty for businessmen in the area
of commercial law.21 Simpson finds the source of this new doctrine in the
civil law.22 Offer and acceptance, if he is correct, are not only late-comers
but foreign imports.
The innovation of offer and acceptance has been so successfully ab-
sorbed that few scholars are puzzled by the relation between offer and
acceptance and the promises that the law of contract is supposed to en-
force. For nineteenth century legal theorists like Langdell, however, the
transformation of an offer into a promise upon acceptance was a question
worth addressing. 23
Some of the difficulties created by the superimposition of the doctrine of
offer and acceptance upon that of promises supported by consideration are
still with us. In our own day, Karl Llewellyn has attempted to turn back
the clock of legal history.24 Llewellyn's goals included obliterating the
sharp distinction which had developed between bilateral and unilateral
contracts, a distinction which he traced to excessive preoccupation with
the doctrine of offer and acceptance. 25
III. GRANTS, NOT PROMISES
Although the allegation of a promise required for bringing assumpsit
was often fictitious, this did not prevent development of the view that the
basis of contractual liability lay in the sanctity of promises. Modern law-
yers have almost entirely lost sight of the fact that "promise" in the law of
20 Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAw Q. REV. 247, 258
(1975).
21 J. BAKER, supra note 15, at 291.
2 Simpson, supra note 20, at 259.
21 C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1879). "Everything,"
Langdell admitted, "except the original offer and the acceptance of it is implied." Id. at 993.
24I owe this observation to S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
(2d ed. 1981), who writes that "common law jurisdictions elsewhere have found it simpler to
turn history back, and state the law in terms which give remedies according to the facts
without reference to this 'passing of property'." Id. at 266. I take this to be a clear reference
to the treatment of title in Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code.
25 Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 33-36. Llewellyn was entirely conscious of the nineteenth-
century roots of the doctrine of offer and acceptance.
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contract is a term of art going back to assumpsit.26 Associating contract
with promise has become so strong that it is not rare to find "promise"
used anachronistically with respect to the action of debt. 27 The basis of
debt, however, was non-promissory. This feature is shared with the Isla-
mic law of contracts.
The contract (and the word "contract" was a term of art used in conjunc-
tion with debt) that underlies the bringing of the debt action was not
conceived by medieval lawyers as arising from an exchange of promises. It
was not future-oriented as is our modern law. Simpson explains,
[t]his was not at all the way in which a consensual debt transac-
tion was looked upon in the old law; such transactions were
thought of as giving, granting or transferring a thing to the cred-
itor. This 'thing', the debt, he could claim by writ of debt because
the transaction had entitled him to it.2 8
So too, for the Muslim jurists, the exchange of offer and acceptance is
not an exchange of promises, even implied promises. Offer and acceptance
are understood as performatives, that is, as constitutive, dispositive utte-
rances (inshd'). For this reason, the law requires that both offer and accep-
tance be couched in the past tense to indicate finality, rather than in the
future tense, which is promissory (cida).2 9 Analyzing offer and acceptance
as performatives is directly related to the notion that the parties are
creating immediate entitlements in each other. In the case of sale, the
property in the goods ordinarily passes to the buyer as soon as the con-
tract is formed-that is, upon the exchange of offer and acceptance.
Unfortunately, the jurists do not dwell on the question of why the con-
tract of sale operates as an immediate conveyance, nor on the larger
question of why contracts are formed by performatives and not promises.
Jurists appear to have regarded sale as synonymous with the transfer of
title to goods. 30 Possibly, although this is only speculation, such a view of
sales represents an Islamic transformation of pre-Islamic law. hIdb, the
word for offer in Islamic law, seems to reflect a stage of law in which sales
were effected by unilateral conveyances, perhaps by those mysterious
formal acts, already mentioned, which were prohibited under Islam. 3
1 If
this theory is correct, the verbal offer and acceptance of Islamic law repre-
26 An exception was E. HARRIMAN, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 13-14 (1896).
P.S. Atiyah has even gone so far as to suggest that legal usage sheds light on the institution
of promising. See P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW (1981).
27 E.g., L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 61 (3d ed. 1972). On this
point, see J. BAKER, supra note 15, at 267.
28 A. SIMPSON, supra note 14, at 79.
29 2 CABDALLAH AL-MAWSILI, AL-IKHTIYAR LI-TACLIL AL-MUKHTAR 4 (Cairo 1951).
30 2 AL-SHtRAZI, supra note 12, at 259.
31 This was already noted by Joseph Schacht. See Schacht, Bay' in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ISLAM (2d ed. 1960).
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sent the superimposition of a consensual view of sale on a system of
formal conveyances. The conveyance (jdb) of the seller became an offer
that would only have its traditional effect when coupled with an accep-
tance (qabfil). Words became fully capable and, in some instances,
uniquely capable of effecting a transfer of property. An inherited under-
standing of sale, the paradigmatic contract, as necessarily involving a
conveyance, would then have determined the way in which offer and ac-
ceptance were analyzed throughout the law of contract.
Apparently, consensualism and the passing of title were also features of
the medieval common law of sale, the transactions enforced by the action
of debt. Professor Milsom contends that consensualism was already a part
of the law of sale in the fifteenth century.3 2 According to Milsom, consen-
sualism preceded the doctrine that property passed upon the formation of
the contract. "The passing of property idea" arose as a means of ra-
tionalizing the enforceability of consensual sales, 33 although one effect
was to retard the spread of consensualism generally. Consensualism, now
understood in light of the passing of property, could not be extended to
transactions in whicti there could be no question of property passing
without a distinct conveyance, notably the sale of land. 4 If Milsom's ac-
count is correct, then the order of development in the common law is once
again the inverse of that of Islamic law, in which consensualism was
superimposed upon conveyancing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Offer and acceptance are the most obvious tokens of the commitment of
Islamic law to consensualism. The repugnance of Islamic law for any-
thing suggesting formalism even led a substantial number of Muslim
jurists to reject the validity of implied-in-fact contracts. In so doing, they
ended up espousing a sort of verbalism.35 By contrast, offer and accep-
tance are late-comers to the common law of contract. Their roles in con-
tract formation tell us relatively little about the underlying principles of
our law of contract.
Although consensual, the Islamic contract is not promissory. It is not
formed by an exchange of promises but by an exchange of grants, which
may reflect a pre-Islamic stage in which sales were unilateral con-
veyances. The prohibition of aleatory contracts in Islamic law confirmed
this tendency to confine transactions as much as possible to the here and
32 Milsom, Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century, 77 LAW Q. REV. 257, 272 (1961).
3 Id. at 275.
3 Id. at 283-84; S. STOLJAR, supra note 13, at 26.
3 C. CARDAHI, LA VENTE EN DROIT COMPARE OCCIDENTAL ET ORIENTAL 44 (1968).
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now.3" In this respect, the Islamic law of contract is reminiscent of the old
common law action of debt, which was also non-promissory. The transac-
tional foundation of debt has survived in our modern law of contract,
although the notion of contract as formed by an exchange of grants has
been completely lost.
This paper has focused on the nature of offer and acceptance rather
than the rules of offer and acceptance. Law is more than rules. No one
should be more acutely aware of this than the legal historian, whose task
it is to study law as a product of human culture in the widest sense.3 7 The
comparativist must beware of too quickly making himself comfortable in
a foreign legal system, particularly one with a very different history from
that of his own. Adequate comparison inevitably involves contrast as well
as similarity. Precisely because the rules of offer and acceptance in Isla-
mic law and the common law invite comparison, the lesson to be learned
is all the more valuable.
36 W. BUCKLAND & A. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 282 (1952)(the authors
observe that "in all ancient laws Sale is essentially a market transaction," in which the
goods are thought of as on the spot. Id.)
37 For what is still an eloquent profession of the significance of this task, see Radin, On
Legal Scholarship, 46 YALE L.J. 1124 (1937).
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